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Based on the adiabatic theory for the evolutionary minority game (EMG) that we proposed
earlier[1], we perform a detail analysis of the EMG limited to three groups of agents. We derive a
formula for the critical point of the transition from segregation (into opposing groups) to clustering
(towards cautious behaviors). Particular to the three-group EMG, the strategy switching in the
“extreme” group does not occur at every losing step and is strongly intermittent. This leads to an
correction to the critical value of the number of agents at the transition, Nc. Our expression for Nc
is in agreement with the results obtained from our numerical simulations.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been growing interests in study of complex
adaptive systems using agent-based modeling. Complex
adaptive systems are ubiquitous in social, economics, and
biological sciences; they consist of agents using adaptive
strategies to compete for limited resources. As changes in
the global environment are induced by the agents them-
selves, it is important to study dynamics of such sys-
tems. Even though agent-based models are simple, the
outcomes may not be at all obvious because the agents
typically use adaptive rather than optimizing strategies.
The Minority Game, proposed by Challet and Zhang[2,
3], is a prototypical agent-based model that can be ana-
lyzed using the tools of statistical mechanics. The game
captures some essential features of complex adaptive sys-
tems in which the agents with limited information and
rationality compete for limited resources. The key ques-
tion in the study of agent-based models is, how evolu-
tion changes the behaviors of the agents. In the con-
text of a simple evolutionary minority game (EMG),
Johnson and coworkers found that the agents universally
self-segregate into two opposing extreme groups.[4] Hod
and Nakar, on the other hand, claimed that a cluster-
ing of cautious agents emerges in a “tough environment”
where the penalty for losing is greater than the reward
for winning.[7] We have derived a general formalism to
understand the dynamical mechanism for the transition
from segregation to clustering.[1] Our theory is based on
an adiabatic approximation, in which short-time fluctu-
ations are integrated out to obtain a steady state pop-
ulation distribution. We found that the effective rate
of evolution plays an important role in determining the
resulting steady-state population distribution. Frequent
strategy switching leads to large market inefficiency that
favors clustering of cautious agents. The theory is il-
lustrated with a detail statistical mechanical analysis of
the EMG limited to three groups of agents: two oppos-
ing groups and one cautious group; it agrees very well
with the numerical simulations of the original EMG, but
deviates from the numerical results of the three-group
EMG. In this paper we perform a further analysis of the
three-group EMG. We show that with an intermittency
correction, which is particular to the three-group EMG,
the numerical results can be explained.
II. PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE
EVOLUTIONARY MINORITY GAME
We first briefly describe the EMG model. There are
N agents. At each round they choose to enter room 0
or room 1. At the end of each round the agents in the
room with fewer agents (in the minority) win a point;
while the agents in the room with more agents lose a
point. The winning room numbers (0 or 1) are recorded.
The agents’ decisions are based on the same record (a
bit-string of length m) of the most recent winning room
numbers. Given the current m-bit string, the common
basic strategy is simply to choose the winning room num-
ber after the most recent pattern of the samem-bit string
in the historical record. To use the basic strategy is thus
to follow the trend. In the EMG each agent is assigned
a probability p: he will adopt the basic strategy with
probability p and adopt the opposite of the basic strat-
egy with probability 1 − p. The agents with p = 0 or 1
are “extreme” players, while the agents with p = 1/2 are
cautious players. The game and its outcomes evolve as
the less successful agents, defined as the ones with the
accumulated wealth less than d (d < 0), change their
p values. In the original EMG model, the new p value
is chosen randomly in the interval of width ∆p centered
around its original p value. His wealth is reset to zero
and the game continues.
Johnson and coworkers showed that the agents self-
segregate into two opposing extreme groups with p ∼ 0
and p ∼ 1.[4, 5, 6] Thus, in order to succeed in a compet-
itive society the agent must take extreme positions. This
behavior can be explained by the market impact of the
agents’ own actions which largely penalizes the cautious
agents.[6] However, Hod and Nakar later found that the
above conclusion is only robust when the reward-to-fine
2ratio R ≥ 1. When R < 1 there is tendency for the agents
to cluster towards cautious behaviors and the distribu-
tion of the p value, P (p), may evolve to an inverted-U
shape with the peak at the middle. We show that the
transition from segregation to clustering in fact depends
on all three parameters, N , R, and d. We derived a gen-
eral expression[1] for the critical value Nc =
[
|d|
A(1−R)
]2
,
where A is a constant of the order one. This was verified
by our extensive simulations of the EMG for a wide range
of the parameter values.[1] When R → 1 the clustering
only occurs for either very large N or very small |d|. At
R = 1 the clustering disappears and the segregation to
extreme behaviors becomes robust.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERAL
ADIABATIC THEORY FOR THE EMG
We now briefly describe our theory, illustrated with the
three-group EMG model, in which p takes only one of the
three possible values 0, 1/2, and 1. The agents in group 0
(with p = 0) make the opposite decision to the agents in
group 1 (with p = 1). We denote the group with p = 1/2
group m; this is the group of cautious agents.
We begin by evaluating the average wealth reduction
for the agents in each of the three groups, given the num-
ber of agents N0, Nm, N1 in group 0, m, and 1 respec-
tively. By comparing the average wealth reduction in the
extreme groups and in the cautious group, we can deter-
mine the transition from clustering to segregation. Let n
be the number of agents in group m making the same de-
cision (decision A) as those in group 0. When Nm ≫ 1,
the distribution of n can be approximated by a Gaussian
distribution P (n) = 1√
2piσm
exp(−(n − Nm/2)2/(2σ2m)),
where σm =
√
Nm/2. By averaging over n, we obtain
the average change of wealth for the agents in group 0,
∆w0 = −1−R
2
+
1 +R
2
erf
(
Nd
2
√
2σm
)
, (1)
where Nd = N1 − N0; erf(x) is the error function
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. Similarly the average change of wealth for
the agents in group 1 is given by,
∆w1 = −1−R
2
− 1 +R
2
erf
(
Nd
2
√
2σm
)
. (2)
The average change of wealth of the agents in the extreme
groups (group 0 and 1) is given by ∆we = (N0∆w0 +
N1∆w1)/(N0 +N1), or
∆we = −1−R
2
− 1 + R
2
Nd
N0 +N1
erf
(
Nd
2
√
2σm
)
. (3)
The second term in ∆we is due to the fluctuations of
Nd; it is always negative. The larger the fluctuation in
Nd, the less efficient the market becomes. This term
can be interpreted as the cost due to market inefficiency.
Large market inefficiency on average penalizes the players
taking “extreme” positions.
The average wealth reduction for the agents in group
m can be evaluated similarly by averaging over n,
∆wm = −(1−R)/2− 1 +R√
2piNm
exp(−N2d/(2Nm)). (4)
The first term in ∆wm is the same as that in ∆we.
The second term can be interpreted as the market
impact.[6] A large market impact (self-interaction) pe-
nalizes the cautious players; their own decisions increase
their chances of being in the majority and hence increase
their chances of losing. The relative magnitudes of the
second terms in ∆we and ∆wm determine whether clus-
tering or segregation dominates.
To further evaluate ∆we and ∆wm, we need to average
over the distribution of Nd. Let δN denote the change
in Nd in one time step. As argued in Ref. [1], the steady
state probability distributionQ(Nd) forNd should satisfy
Q(Nd) = W−(Nd + δN)Q(Nd + δN)
+W+(Nd − δN))Q(Nd − δN), (5)
where W± = 12 [1∓ erf(Nd/(2
√
2σm)]. This equation can
be solved to give the distribution Q(Nd). After averaging
Nd over Q(Nd), we obtain
∆we = −1−R
2
− (1 +R)
2
δN
2(N0 +N1)
. (6)
∆wm, on the other hand, is given by
∆wm ∼ −1−R
2
− 1 +R√
2pi
1√
Nm + σ2d
. (7)
Here σd =
√√
2pi
2
√
σmδN . At the critical point, N0 =
N1 = Nm = N/3, and ∆we = ∆wm. It is easy to verify
that this occurs when
δN ∼
√
N. (8)
Note that δN is the number of extreme agents switch-
ing their strategies per time step. On average δN =
2N0/(|d|/((1−R)/2)) = N0(1−R)/|d|, thus the crossover
value for N is Nc = d
2/[A(1−R)]2. As shown in Ref. [1]
the derivation can be generalized to a general EMG in-
volving more than three groups of agents.
IV. GAP DISTRIBUTION AND
INTERMITTENCY CORRECTION
While the expression Nc = d
2/[A(1 − R)]2 describes
very well the transition in the original EMG with a con-
tinuous distribution of p, it does not describe the R de-
pendence of Nc correctly for the transition in the three-
group EMG. This is due to the following particular fea-
ture of the three-group EMG. The strategy switching of
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FIG. 1: Schematic illustration of the wealth distributions of
group 0, m, and 1. There are gaps in the distributions for the
extreme group 0 and 1
the agents in the “extreme” groups does not occur at ev-
ery losing step and is rather intermittent. A loss at the
current round, for example, will not make the agents in
the extreme groups to switch strategy if they have won in
the previous two rounds. This gives rise to a gap ∆ be-
tween the lowest value of the wealth in an extreme group
and the strategy-switching threshold at d, as schemati-
cally illustrated in Figure 1.
When the wealth distribution of the losing extreme
group has ∆ > 1, Nd does not change, because no switch-
ing occurs in or out of the extreme groups. Only the
cases with ∆ < 1 affect the distribution of Nd. Thus
we need to use the effective number of extreme agents
switching their strategies per time step, averaged only
over the cases with ∆ < 1. This effective rate of switch-
ing is given by δN˜ = δN/z = N0(1−R)/(z|d|), where z is
the probability that ∆ < 1. The effect of intermittency
of the strategy switching can be taken into account by
using this effective δN˜ .
To obtain the intermittency correction to the expres-
sion of Nc, we need to first calculate the probability z.
Let P (∆) be the probability distribution of ∆. Since
there are always new agents with wealth 0 coming from
group m at each step, ∆ cannot be greater than |d|. Thus
P (|d|) = 0. Since there are roughly equal numbers of
winning and losing steps, P (∆) should satisfy
P (∆) =
1
2
P (∆ + 1) +
1
2
P (∆−R). (9)
For |d| ≫ 1 we can approximate the above equation using
the following differential equation (this is adequate as
P (∆) is rather smoothly varying as a function of ∆).
P
′′
(∆) + λP ′(∆) = 0, (10)
where λ = 2(1−R)1+R2 . Given the condition P (|d|) = 0, the
|d|
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FIG. 2: The critical value N vs |dc| for R =
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, and 0.975
solution of the equation is
P (∆) = B(e−λ∆ − e−λ|d|). (11)
B is determined using the normalization condition∫ |d|
0
P (∆)d∆ = 1:
B =
λ
1− e−λ|d| − λ|d|e−λ|d| .
Now z is given by
z =
∫ 1
0
P (∆)d∆ =
1− e−λ − λe−λ|d|
1− e−λ|d| − λ|d|e−λ|d| (12)
The critical value Nc is determined from the relation
δN˜c ∼
√
Nc; this gives rise to
Nc ∼ (zd)2/(1−R)2. (13)
The numerical values of Nc vs |d| from our extensive
simulations are plotted in Figure 2. One notable feature
is that Nc is proportional to d
2, but is independent of R
for sufficiently large values of |d|. This can be explained
using the above expression of Nc. For |d|(1−R)≫ 1 and
1−R≪ 1, z can be approximated by z ∼ λ ∼ 1−R. This
gives rise to Nc ∼ d2 for |d| ≫ 1/(1−R). From the figure,
we can see the crossover to the Nc ∼ d2 behavior occurs
roughly at d = 2/(1−R), in agreement with the theory.
This unique feature of the three-group EMG model is
completely due to the existence of a gap in the wealth
distribution of the extreme groups. For the original EMG
model, there is no such gap, and Nc ∼ d2/(1−R)2 holds
very well.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have derived an intermittency cor-
rection to the critical value Nc for the three-group EMG.
4Our estimates of Nc agree well with the numerical re-
sults. We have identified the key difference between the
three-group EMG and the original EMG with a contin-
uous distribution of the p values: the existence of a gap
in the wealth distribution of the extreme groups in the
three-group EMG. This key difference leads to a quali-
tative correction to the expression for Nc. The general
framework of the adiabatic approximation, however, is
equally valid for studying the transition in both the orig-
inal EMG and the three-group EMG.
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